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The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause does not prevent the federal (or 
a state) government from taking private property.  It merely sets as a 
condition that the government pay the owner “just compensation” for the 
taking.  Precisely what constitutes just compensation, however, is a tricky 
matter.  One method for determining just compensation is the “market-
value” method, which, unsurprisingly, requires the government to pay the 
owner the property’s market value.  But where a taking is only partial, that 
is, where the government takes only a portion of an individual’s property, the 
property that remains with the owner may see an increase or decrease in its 
value.  A line of Supreme Court cases suggests that this incidental benefit (or 
harm) should be quantified and set off from the ultimate amount the 
government pays.   
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court adhered to 
the market-value method even though the regulation at issue required that 
California raisin growers turn over only a portion of their raisin crop each 
year.  What is more, the program was specifically designed to stabilize prices 
and afford raisin farmers myriad benefits.  While adhering to the market-
value standard provided the Court with a measure of expediency, this Note 
argues that the Court’s decision may spell trouble for future regulation.  If 
regulators cannot consider incidental economic effects in determining 
regulatory costs, the government may be forced to pay artificially inflated 
prices for regulations that involve takings.  Such a result could make 
regulation overall more costly, or worse, discourage it entirely. 
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The characterization of a large federal government as bumbling and inept 
is far from novel.  Indeed, dissatisfaction with the post-New Deal 
bureaucracy has been a rallying point of political commentary for decades, if 
not for the better part of a century.1  Commentators often generalize, lumping 
politicians and constituents into categories defined by “big government” or 
“small government.”  As with any generalization, these descriptors are in no 
way exhaustive, as segments of traditional political ideologies are 
continuously branching off, reforming, and reinventing themselves.2  Still, 
the debate over the role (and particularly the size) of the federal government 
remains fervent across the board.  This debate has led to an increased focus 
on the perceived overreach of numerous federal regulatory programs.3   
Ideological division and debate is not limited to the political sphere.  The 
current Supreme Court bench is viewed by some as one of the most 
ideologically divided Courts in history.4  In fact, the Roberts Court has seen 
the highest percentage of 5-to-4 decisions (around 21%) than any other Court 
                                                
1  See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
421, 421–22 (1987). 
2  The Tea Party, to name one of the more notable examples, enjoyed 
unexpected success during the 2010 midterm elections as the Republican party 
regained control of the House of Representatives.  Paul Harris & Ewen MacAskill, 
US midterm election results herald new political era as Republicans take House, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/03/us-
midterm-election-results-tea-party [https://perma.cc/HL2Y-LMK3].  
3  See id. (discussing the priorities of the then-incoming Republican majority in 
the house, including its plans to aggressively attack President Obama’s landmark 
healthcare reform).  
4  See, e.g., David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of 
the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 29, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-
politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/ [https://perma.cc/TBZ2-859P].  




before it.5  Often times, this division coalesces around the scope of the 
federal government’s regulatory powers over individuals and the states.6  
Admittedly, the case from the Court’s 2014–15 term that this Note will 
treat in depth, Horne v. Department of Agriculture (Horne II),7 does not 
readily present as such an ideologically divisive case.  In Horne II,8 the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) marketing order mandating that California raisin 
growers set aside a portion of their crop for the federal government every 
year, free of charge.  The Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of 1937 
(“AMAA”)9 gives the USDA the authority to issue such marketing orders to 
maintain a balanced and orderly market.  After obtaining title to growers’ 
raisins, an administrative committee (composed of other raisin growers, 
raisin handlers, and one layperson) disposes of the raisins as it sees fit to 
effectuate the purposes of the marketing order, that is, to maintain a level 
market, secure stable prices, and ensure growing, inspection, and product-
quality standards. 
In 2002, the Hornes, raisin growers and handlers, refused to set aside the 
required reserve portion and the government levied a fine of over $680,000 
against them.  The Hornes challenged the marketing order as a violation of 
the Takings Clause, which prohibits the federal government from taking 
private property for public use without just compensation.10  The district 
court found that no taking had occurred, and the Court of Appeals agreed, 
also holding that the marketing order itself did not constitute an 
impermissible regulatory taking.11 
The Hornes appealed, and the Supreme Court divided 8-to-1 in reversing 
the lower court’s decision and holding that the raisin reserve program was 
                                                
5 Id.; see also Lucas Rodriguez, The Troubling Partisanship of the 
Supreme Court, STAN. POL. J. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://stanfordpolitics.com/the-
troubling-partisanship-of-the-supreme-court-da9fd5a900ac#.q8udw2wr9 
[https://perma.cc/YHT8-S38Q].  
6  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (5-to-4; 
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to license same-sex 
marriages and recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. 
Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (5-to-4; concerning facially the propriety of Oklahoma’s 
three-drug lethal injection cocktail, but perhaps more realistically addressing the 
death penalty in general). 
7  135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
8  The general facts of Horne II touched on in this Introduction are discussed in 
greater detail infra at Part II. The AMAA and the California Raisin Marketing 
Order. 
9  Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (1937). 
10  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2424–25 (laying out the facts giving rise to the Hornes 
cause of action); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
11  See infra Part III. Horne II & (Un)Just Compensationfor a more detailed 
description of Horne II’s procedural history. 
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indeed a taking requiring just compensation.12  Yet the issue of whether the 
Court should remand to the Ninth Circuit to consider whether participation in 
the marketing program offered any quantifiable incidental benefit, and if that 
benefit should be set-off against the value of the taken raisins, divided the 
Court along ideological lines.  The majority held that there was no 
quantifiable incidental benefit to participating in the program and determined 
that the “market value” standard for just compensation should be used to set 
compensation levels.13  Since the government had already calculated the 
market value of the raisins in assessing its fine against the Hornes, the Court 
held that there was no reason for a new calculation.14  Instead, it simply 
relieved the Hornes of their obligation to pay.15   
The majority’s brief treatment of this argument makes the issue seem 
unimportant.  Proceeding no further than the majority opinion, a reader might 
view Horne II as little more than the Court’s conservative bloc pruning what 
had become (in its view) an overreaching and antiquated New Deal-era 
agricultural program.  But the concurring opinion in Horne II reveals a more 
complicated, nuanced picture.  This Note argues that the concurrence more 
accurately perceives the importance of the issue, which is vital to the future 
of federal Takings Clause jurisprudence. 
Part I outlines a brief history of the pertinent aspects of the Court’s 
takings jurisprudence.  The Takings Clause has been particularly 
troublesome for the Court, in large part due to a dearth of historical 
information on the colonial-era understanding of government takings.  This 
uncertainty has led to varying suppositions concerning the extent to which 
the Takings Clause was intended to constrain the government, and the debate 
persists to this day.16  Part I also introduces the issue of just compensation, 
and the two methods of determining compensation with which Horne II 
struggled.17 
Part II describes the Raisin Marketing Order’s history in more depth, and 
analyzes the AMAA and the USDA’s subsequent regulations from a 
purposive standpoint.  The regulatory scheme was born, arguably in 
substantial part, from a desire to benefit the American consumer through 
establishing growing and quality standards, as well as the American farmer 
by stabilizing the market for and prices of agricultural commodities.18   
                                                
12  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).  Justices Kagan 
and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in his partial concurrence, while Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas joined the Chief Justice’s majority opinion. 
13  Id. at 2432. 
14  Id. at 2433. 
15  Id. 
16  See infra Part I.A 
17  See infra Part I.B. 
18  See infra Part II. The AMAA and the California Raisin Marketing 
Order. 




Part III discusses the Horne II opinion in detail, focusing primarily on 
just compensation.  The majority briefly treated this issue at the close of the 
opinion and retreated to a formalistic position on how to calculate 
compensation, that is, looking only to the raisins’ market value.  But this 
Note argues that modern courts are capable of a more accurate valuation.  By 
neglecting to consider the benefits that the marketing order afforded to the 
individual growers and handlers when calculating just compensation—
especially in circumstances where such benefits are readily ascertainable—
the Court struck an unjust balance between private and public interests.  
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion recognized this nuanced position, but did 
not fully expound on why the position was of such importance.19 
This Note will do just that, albeit briefly.  The final section of Part III 
hypothesizes as to the future of Takings Clause jurisprudence in the wake of 
Horne II.  It offers an example of why the Court’s decision to strictly (and 
perhaps blindly) adhere to a formalistic standard of just compensation may 
spell serious trouble for future government action.20 
  
I. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
The text of the Constitution does not forbid the federal government from 
taking private property; it merely creates as a condition to a taking that the 
government must compensate the property owner.21  Of course, as is often 
the case, a simple turn of constitutional phrasing never yields proportionately 
simple jurisprudence.  The body of Takings Clause law has ballooned and 
evolved over time, but it generally coalesces into two categories: (1) 
paradigmatic per se takings, wherein the government physically appropriates 
or dispossesses an individual of his or her property;22 and (2) regulatory 
takings, wherein a regulation or law has the effect of dispossessing a property 
owner of his or her property or its economic value.23  This Part describes 
generally the origins and treatments of these two categories of takings, and 
then discusses the issue of just compensation. 
 
A. Physical Takings 
 
When a layperson considers governmental takings (which this author is 
certain the average individual does on a regular basis), he or she probably 
imagines the doctrine of eminent domain.  This doctrine allows the 
                                                
19  See infra part III.B. 
20  See infra part III.C. 
21  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (quoting First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 314 (1987)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
22  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. 
23  Id. 
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government (state or federal) to take private property without the owner’s 
consent.24  This power, as with all takings, is conditioned on the government 
providing the owner with just compensation.25  With regards to eminent 
domain, the government is also restricted to taking private property for a 
“public purpose.”26   
The requirement that the government provide just compensation in order 
to exercise its taking power, as an equitable matter, makes sense.  On one 
hand, the power of the government to appropriate private property for public 
use—potentially against the will of the private property owner—makes us 
uneasy; on the other, a private individual’s interests should not be allowed to 
unilaterally obstruct the government when the government acts on the 
public’s behalf and for the public’s benefit.27   
The earliest instances of governmental takings involved the direct 
appropriation of physical property.28  But eminent domain was only the 
beginning.  Soon, the Supreme Court was addressing not only the permanent 
appropriation of private property, but also temporary “physical invasion[s] . . 
. and [the] practical ouster” of property owners.29  As an example of this 
latter variety, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Causby30 that 
frequent flights directly over a landowner’s property constituted a taking.31  
Though the owner was not permanently deprived of his or her property, the 
government had constructively achieved the same result.  Accordingly, this 
grouping of both permanent occupations and recurring invasions is deemed 
“categorical” or “per se,” as no justification of public purpose allows the 
government to avoid paying the property owner.32 
                                                
24  Rex Realty Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 322 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 2003). 
25  Id. at 529 
26  Mt. San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Superior Court, 151 P.3d 1166, 1175 
(Cal. 2007).  The Supreme Court has pulled essentially all of the Public Use Clause’s 
teeth, however.  Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here 
the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable 
public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by 
the Public Use Clause.”).  
27 For a thorough discussion of the concerns behind governmental takings before 
and after enactment of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, see generally 
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and 
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785–92 (1995). 
28 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 322 (2002) (“Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings 
is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward 
application of per se rules.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 
(1992); see also Treanor, supra note 27, at 785–92.  
29  Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879) (emphasis added). 
30  328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
31  Id. at 261. 
32  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014–16. 




B. Regulatory Takings 
 
The second category of takings, regulatory takings, first arose in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.33  There, Justice Holmes recognized that 
“[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”34  Put 
another way, “government regulation of private property may, in some 
instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation 
or ouster—and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable.”35  
Clearly, the terms “direct appropriation” and “ouster” help tie regulatory 
takings to their physical brethren.  But instead of the airplane flying overhead 
that deprives the property owner of the use and enjoyment of her land (as in 
Causby, for example) it is the effect of a law or regulation that does so. 
Because of the intangible nature of regulatory takings, determining 
whether one has occurred requires an “ad hoc” approach that weighs all 
relevant facts.36  This is perhaps the most important distinguishing feature 
between physical takings and regulatory takings: if the regulation does not 
“go too far,” then there has not been a taking that requires just 
compensation.37  The rationale behind this is practical in nature.  Property-
use regulations are so prevalent that if each instance were considered a 
compensable, categorical taking, the government would wind up paying 
property owners hand over fist.38  Accordingly, a court reviewing an alleged 
regulatory taking weighs the extent to which the regulation has invaded the 
property owner’s interests against the government’s inherent right to set 
limits and conditions on private actors’ behavior,39 affording “[t]he greatest 
weight . . . to the judgment of the Legislature.”40   
There are, however, certain examples of regulatory takings for which the 
Court has categorically stated that compensation is due; indeed, these 
regulatory intrusions are so invasive as to qualify as per se takings.41  
                                                
33  260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
34  Id. at 415. 
35  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. 
36  Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York (Penn Central), 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978). 
37  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323. 
38  Id. 
39  See Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to 
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law. As long recognized some values are enjoyed 
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.”); see also Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992) (noting an even broader ability 
to regulate when the property at issue is personal property, “by reason of the State's 
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings”). 
40  Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413. 
41  See Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (discussing in particular Loretto and Lucas). 
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Perhaps the most famous of these categorical regulatory takings occurred in 
Lucas v. Southern Carolina Coastal Council.  In Lucas, the plaintiff bought 
two beachfront properties in South Carolina.42  Soon thereafter, the state 
enacted a Beachfront Management Act, which prevented the plaintiff from 
erecting permanent habitable structures on his land.43  Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, held that where a regulation deprives a property owner of 
“all economically beneficial use” of her land, the regulation constitutes a per 
se, or categorical, taking.44  The only way South Carolina could save its 
sweeping regulation of the whole state’s coastline from constituting a taking 
would be to show that building habitable dwellings on the coast constituted a 
public nuisance at common law.45  
Another example of where the Court has found government regulation to 
effect a taking per se was in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp.46  In Loretto, a New York state statute required that a landlord permit 
cable television companies to install cable equipment on his or her 
property.47  The defendant cable television company had installed cable 
equipment on the property while it was under a previous owner’s 
management.48  Once the plaintiff discovered the equipment after acquiring 
the property, she brought suit against the company under the Takings 
Clause.49  The Supreme Court held that the statute worked as an 
unconstitutional taking in that it required landlords to suffer a permanent 
physical occupation of their property, albeit an occupation of a very small 
area.50  The Court’s reasoning was hybrid in nature: it examined the statute as 
a regulatory taking under Penn Central51 and yet also noted the physical 
nature of the defendant’s occupation pursuant to the statute.52  The Court 
nonetheless purported to reaffirm only the traditional rule that “permanent 
physical occupation of property is a taking,” and that a state may yet regulate 
as to building codes, just not where such regulation requires a property 
holder to suffer a physical taking.53  
                                                
42  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07. 
43  Id. at 1007. 
44  Id. at 1027. 
45  See id. at 1031. 
46  458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
47  Id. at 423. 
48  Id. at 421–22. 
49  Id. at 424. 
50  Id. at 438. 
51  Id. at 425–27. 
52 Id. at 438 (“Teleprompter's cable installation on appellant's building 
constitutes a taking under the traditional [permanent occupation] test. The 
installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and 
screws to the building . . . .”). 
53  See id. at 426–27. 




Some prominent commentators question the tenability of regulatory 
takings altogether.54  William Treanor, for instance, noted that while Justice 
Holmes position on regulatory takngs in Pennsylvania Coal is appealing at 
first blush, it finds no basis in the “text, original understanding, [or] early 
interpretations of the Takings Clause.”55  Justice Blackmun argued likewise 
in his dissenting opinion in Lucas, stating that “James Madison, the author of 
the Takings Clause, apparently intended it to apply only to direct, physical 
takings of property by the Federal Government.”56   Further, though 
contemporary accounts from the Taking Clause’s passage are in “short 
supply,” the clause would have originally been intended to prevent arbitrary 
government action, not protect value.57  Textual foundation aside, what is 
clear is that the ad hoc analysis applied to alleged regulatory takings affords 
judges considerable leeway in determining if compensation is due.58   
 
C. Just Compensation 
 
Once a court finds that a taking has occurred, the next step is determining 
what measure of compensation is owed to the property owner.59  As a textual 
matter, the Constitution says nothing of how to determine compensation, and 
it certainly does not equate “compensation” with “value.”60  Naturally, the 
presence of an undefined term in the Constitution has bred confusion.  Olson 
v. United States,61 an early Supreme Court Takings Clause case, succinctly 
stated that the compensation due for a governmental taking is “the market 
value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in 
                                                
54  See generally Treanor, supra note 27, at 803. 
55  Id. 
56  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1057 n.23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing William 
Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985)); but see Andrew S. 
Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis 
“Goes Too Far”, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 242 (1999) (arguing that, due to the 
sparseness of historical information and conflicting contemporary understandings, 
the Takings Clause can and should be interpreted to cover as much ground as the text 
allows, and regulatory takings certainly fall within this ambit). 
57  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1057 n.23 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police 
Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 58–60 (1964)). 
58  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (noting that “[s]ince 
Mahon we have given some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted with 
deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory 
taking”).   
59  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
60  See id.; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 570 (1897) (“[T]he constitution does 
not require that value should be paid, but that compensation should be given.”). 
61  292 U.S. 246 (1934). 
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money.”62  The rationale behind the “market-value” method is simple: the 
property owner “is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if 
his property had not been taken . . . .  He must be made whole but is not 
entitled to more.”63  But what precisely it means to be “made whole” is not so 
evident.   
At minimum, being made “whole” implies a determination of what has 
been taken.  But in certain circumstances, this irreducible minimum will be 
insufficient.  Where the taking is only partial, that is, where the taker leaves 
behind some property, the market-value method unravels.64  The remaining 
property’s value will be affected not simply by the loss, but by other factors, 
such as what incidental effects the taking might have had the remaining 
property.65  In circumstances where the taking increases the remaining 
property’s value, offering full reimbursement for the market value of the 
taken portion will afford the owner a windfall.  Conversely, if by taking a 
portion of property the government reduces the value of what remains, 
offering only the property’s market value will undercompensate the owner. 
In Bauman v. Ross, the Supreme Court recognized this predicament, and 
introduced a “set-off” method of valuation.66  Bauman held that “when part 
only of a parcel of land is taken . . . the value of that part is not the sole 
measure of the compensation or damages to be paid to the owner; but the 
incidental injury or benefit to the part not taken is also to be considered.”67  
The Supreme Court would go on to apply this principle numerous times, 
setting off non-monetary or incidental benefits against the total market value 
of the property taken.68   
                                                
62  Id. at 255. 
63  Id. 
64 See Bauman, 167 U.S. at 569–70; see also Tim Kowal, The Restitutionary 
Approach to Just Compensation, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 453, 471 (2006) (discussing 
instances where simply assessing the damage done to the aggrieved property owner 
is insufficient to calculate appropriate compensation). 
65  See e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376–77 (1943) (stating that, in 
certain instances where condemnation of property raises the value of adjacent 
property, such benefit should be factored into compensation); Borough of Harvey 
Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526–27 (N.J. 2013) (holding that the storm protection 
afforded by the construction of a beachfront dune must be considered in calculating 
just compensation for nearby property owners); see also Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 
2434–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (enumerating many other cases in which the 
Court has assessed incidental benefits done to property owners through the taking 
itself in determining just compensation). 
66  Bauman, 167 U.S. at 569–70.  This note will refer to the method established in 
Bauman as the “Bauman doctrine.” 
67  Id. at 574. 
68  See Horne II, at 2434–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (listing numerous 
examples of Supreme Court precedent including United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 
U.S. 256, 266–67 (1939) (“[I]f governmental activities inflict slight damage upon 




II. THE AMAA AND THE CALIFORNIA RAISIN MARKETING ORDER 
 
Marketing orders originated in various forms in the decades before the 
Dust Bowl period.69  The AMAA codified the practice of and procedure for 
implementing and structuring these orders.70  The AMAA was not Congress’ 
first attempt at stabilizing agricultural markets and commodity prices.  In 
1929 Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Act,71 appropriating $500 
million to the Federal Farm Board with instructions to achieve these goals.72  
Unfortunately, the stock market spiraled downwards only a few months later 
and agricultural commodity prices went with it.73  Congress regrouped and 
passed the Agricultural Adjustments Act of 1933.74  The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act was broad in scope, and in its initial publication went as far 
as to make a “Declaration of Emergency,” which stated in pertinent part:  
 
That the present acute economic emergency being in part the 
consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the 
prices of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity 
has largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for 
industrial products, has broken down the orderly exchange of 
commodities, and has seriously impaired the agricultural 
assets supporting the national credit structure . . .75 
 
The Supreme Court held the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional in 
1936,76 but Congress was undeterred.  Congress passed the AMAA in 1937, 
picking up where the Agricultural Marketing Act left off, and amended its 
initial declaration of policy to state more modest goals.  Nonetheless, the 
original intentions of Congress remain clear: to create and maintain “orderly 
                                                                                                               
land in one respect and actually confer great benefits when measured in the whole, to 
compensate the landowner further would be to grant him a special bounty. Such 
activities in substance take nothing from the landowner.”)).   
69  Stacie L. Melikian, California Raisins: Compliance with the Federal 
Marketing Order and Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, 5 SAN JOAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REV. 89, 90 (2006). 
70  See 7 U.S.C. §§ 601–674.  The irony of the Act’s title has not been lost on 
commentators, given that the purpose of the act is to authorize mandatory marketing 
orders, rather than voluntary “Agreements.”  Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural 
Philosophies and Policies in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 344 (1983). 
71  Agricultural Marketing Act, ch. 24, 46 Stat. 11 (1929). 
72  Breimyer, supra note 70, at 339. 
73  Id. 
74  See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 43 Stat. 31 (1933). 
75  Id. 
76  U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (finding that Congress’ use of its power 
to tax and spend in order to regulate the agricultural industry was impermissible). 
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marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce . . 
.” so as to “avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices.”77  
The AMAA singled out numerous agricultural commodities as specific 
regulatory targets, including California raisins.78  Based on the statute’s 
language, these commodities are regulated in this fashion in order to create 
and maintain “orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in 
interstate commerce . . .” and to “establish minimum standards of quality, 
maturity, grading, and inspection requirements.”79  Pursuant to this statutory 
authority, the Secretary of Agriculture (the “Secretary”) promulgated the 
marketing order for Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California.  The 
sections of the order relevant to this Note are §§ 989.66 and 989.67, which 
pertain to “free-tonnage” and “reserve-tonnage” raisins, and how the 
Secretary acquires and disposes of them.   
According to the marketing order, the Raisin Administrative Committee 
(“RAC”), a group of raisin producers and handlers,80 administers the 
marketing order and acts as an intermediary between the Secretary and other 
raisin farmers.81  Once a year, the RAC recommends a percentage of raisins 
that should physically be set aside by handlers pursuant to the order—this 
constitutes the “reserve tonnage.”82  This percentage can vary drastically: in 
1983 the RAC recommended reserving 62.5% of the crop, but in 2005 only 
17.5%.83  Pursuant to the RAC’s decision, producers deliver their harvest to 
handlers, who set aside reserve-tonnage raisins for the RAC and pay 
producers for the “free-tonnage” raisins.84  The free-tonnage raisins are those 
raisins not set aside pursuant to the marketing order that the handlers will sell 
commercially on the producers’ behalf.85  After collecting the reserve 
tonnage raisins from the handlers and tracking the quantities each producer 
contributes, the RAC disposes of the reserve as it sees fit, but always in 
accordance with the general guidelines of 7 C.F.R. § 989.67(b).86  Generally, 
the RAC will sell the reserve tonnage raisins in non-competitive markets, to 
other federal agencies, or to foreign governments and importers.87  At the end 
of the season, the RAC returns the proceeds from its sales on a pro rata basis 
                                                
77  7 U.S.C. § 602(1), (4). 
78  Id. at § 608c(6)(I). 
79  Id. at § 602. 
80  Under 7 C.F.R. § 989.26, the 47-person committee consists of 35 raisin 
producers, 10 handlers, one representative of the collective bargaining association, 
and one lay person. 
81  See id. at § 989.63. 
82  Id. at § 989.54(d). 
83  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., No. CV–F–08–1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, 
at *25 n.9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009), rev’d, Horne II. 
84   See 7 C.F.R. § 989.66. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. at § 989.67(b). 
87  7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(E); 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h). 




to the original participating producers, who have retained an equitable 
interest in the reserve tonnage throughout the process.88   
Courts have characterized the purpose of the marketing order in different 
ways.  The Supreme Court, for instance, described the AMAA’s overall 
regulatory scheme as designed to “help maintain stable markets for particular 
agricultural products.”89  The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, in an opinion 
the Supreme Court would later reverse, noted that “[t]he program’s goal is to 
keep raisin supply relatively constant from year to year, smoothing the raisin 
supply curve and thus bringing predictability to the market for producers and 
consumers alike.”90  According to the USDA’s marketing policy in § 989.54, 
the RAC must also consider such factors as raisin quality, grade, and 
consumer income levels when setting the reserve percentage.91  The variety 
of factors the RAC is instructed to take into account in setting the reserve 
percentage reflects the varied goals of the program.   
Because the RAC may be particularly concerned with one aspect of the 
market or consumer welfare one year and something entirely different in 
other years, it becomes difficult to accurately quantify the benefits of the 
program.  One empirical study of the raisin marketing order from the early 
1990s noted this difficulty.92  The authors stated rather equivocally that  
 
consumers were not made worse off . . . , that the program 
reduced the variability of prices and return . . . , [g]rower 
average net returns may or may not have increased . . . , 
[and] [o]verall, the results of the study suggest the public 
interest may have been well served by the raisin control 
program, or at worst, there was no significant welfare loss.93 
 
Despite these less-than-definitive results, the study’s conclusion 
demonstrates that the program often affords the general consuming public 
and the raisin producers and handlers benefits along a number of different 
metrics.   
The RAC itself is composed only of persons “actively engaged in the 
business of the group which he represents either in his own behalf, or as an 
officer, agent, or employee of a business unit engaged in such business.”94  
                                                
88  7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h). 
89  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2419, 2424 (2015). 
90  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Horne 
II. 
91  7 C.F.R. § 989.54(e). 
92  See Ben C. French & Carole Frank Nuckton, An Empirical Analysis of 
Economic Performance Under the Marketing Order for Raisins, 73 AM. J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 581, 592–93 (1991). 
93  Id. at 593. 
94  7 C.F.R. § 989.27. 
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And this direct representation on the RAC cannot be far removed: “only 
producers . . . engaged as such with respect to the most recent grape crop, are 
eligible to serve on the Committee . . . [and] [o]nly handlers who packed or 
processed raisins during the then current crop year shall be eligible to 
represent handlers on the Committee.”95  The relevant regulations also leave 
the administration of the marketing order largely, if not entirely, in the hands 
of the community it was designed to benefit.  This, along with the fact that 
the RAC receives no federal funding,96 demonstrates a conscious attempt to 
incentivize the RAC’s good-faith behavior and maximize the agricultural 
community’s and the public’s ultimate benefit.97    
 
III. HORNE II & (UN)JUST COMPENSATION 
 
In 2004, an Administrator of the Agriculture Marketing Service filed a 
complaint at the USDA against the Hornes, raisin farmers for nearly fifty 
years as well as handlers under the marketing order, for violation of the 
AMAA.98  The Administrator levied a fine of over $680,000 against the 
Hornes, including the USDA’s assessment of the unremitted reserve tonnage 
pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 989.166(c), and a civil fine of approximately 
$200,000.99  While an appeal of their administrative case remained pending, 
the Hornes filed suit in the Eastern District of California, seeking declaratory 
relief on various grounds, one of which was the Takings Clause.100  The 
district court held that, since no physical taking occurred, the Fifth 
Amendment claim must fail.101   
                                                
95  Id. 
96  Id. at § 989.82 (“All pool expenses shall be deducted from the proceeds 
obtained by the committee from the sale or other disposal of such reserve raisins held 
for the account of the committee.”). 
97  See id. § 989.67(d)(1) (“Reserve tonnage raisins shall be sold to handlers at 
prices and in a manner intended to maximum producer returns and achieve 
maximum disposition of such raisins by the time reserve tonnage raisins from the 
subsequent crop year are available.”); see also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 
1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Horne II. 
98  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., No. CV–F–08–1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, 
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009), rev’d, Horne II. 
99  Id.; 7 C.F.R. 989.166(c) (2004). 
100  Horne, 2009 WL 4895362, at *7, *23. 
101  Id. at *27.  For simplicity’s sake, this Note omits from the body text an 
intervening step in the litigation.  The Court of Appeals originally affirmed the trial 
court’s holding on procedural grounds.  See Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 673 F.3d 
1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012).  The court found that, since the Hornes had brought suit 
in their capacity as raisin producers rather than handlers, they were required to first 
sue in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, rather than in federal 
district court.  Id.  The Hornes appealed.  Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous 
court, overruled the Ninth Circuit’s holding.  See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. (Horne I), 




The Court of Appeals agreed that the Hornes had not suffered a 
“paradigmatic” taking, and decided to wade through the “doctrinal thicket of 
the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.”102  The court 
reasoned that “[b]ecause the government neither seized any raisins from the 
Hornes’ land nor removed any money from the Hornes’ bank account, the 
Hornes cannot—and do not—argue they suffered this sort of ‘paradigmatic 
taking.’”103  This conclusion is predicated upon the fact that in the year the 
Hornes refused to comply with the marketing order, no property changed 
hands.  The Hornes found themselves in administrative hot water for the very 
reason that they did not deliver their share of raisins to the RAC.  The 
decisive question, then, at least to the Court of Appeals, was whether the fine 
was the result of an unconstitutional regulatory program.104  The court 
answered that question in the negative.105   
 
A. Personal vs. Real Property–Does it Make a Difference? 
  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the marketing order effected a 
taking of private property for which compensation was due.106  As a 
threshold matter, the Court held that the government’s duty to compensate 
for an unlawful taking does not depend on whether the property taken is 
personal or real property.107  The Constitution does not distinguish between 
personalty and realty in the Takings Clause.108  The Court also stated that 
“[n]othing in the . . . history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents, 
suggests that the rule [regarding per se takings] is any different when it 
comes to appropriation of personal property.”109  Unfortunately, this 
contention is not entirely accurate.   
In Lucas, Justice Scalia stated that a “property owner necessarily expects 
the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various 
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police 
powers.”110  He went on to clarify that this expectation is even more 
pronounced  
                                                                                                               
133 S. Ct. 2053, 2064 (2013).  Since the Hornes had raised the Takings Clause issue 
as an affirmative defense to the government’s administrative action, the Hornes 
could challenge the fine on constitutional grounds in District Court pursuant to 7 
U.S.C. § 608c(14).  Id. at 2063–64. 
102  Horne, 750 F.3d at 1138. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 1144. 
105  Id. 
106  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015). 
107  Id. at 2425. 
108  See U.S. CONST. amend V. 
109  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426. 
110  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (citing Andrus 
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1979)). 
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in the case of personal property, [where] by reason of the 
State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial 
dealings, [the property owner] ought to be aware of the 
possibility that new regulation might even render his 
property economically worthless (at least if the property’s 
only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for 
sale).111 
 
This proposition’s applicability to the Horne’s personal property, their 
raisins, does not require a great leap of reason.  The Hornes, and all raisin 
growers similarly situated, certainly had reason to know that the federal 
government had an interest in regulating their personal property—California 
raisins had been subject to the marketing order for decades.112  Further, the 
Hornes did not dispute that the raisins’ only economically productive use was 
in their eventual sale.113  The Court offered no explanation for its deviation 
from Justice Scalia’s reasoning.  Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts made 
certain to set forth at the outset of his opinion that the Takings Clause 
protects property “without any distinction between different types.”114   
 
B. Unjust Compensation? 
 
Putting aside the question of whether the marketing order constitutes a 
taking,115 this Note argues that the more problematic oversight was the 
                                                
111  Id. 
112  See generally supra Part II. The AMAA and the California Raisin 
Marketing Order. 
113  See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14-
275) (acknowledging that agricultural products “are in a sense fungible and useful to 
the businesses that deal in them only by generating revenue” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
114  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426. 
115  Justice Sotomayor offers an exhaustive (and well reasoned) analysis of why 
the majority’s holding as to whether the marketing order constitutes a taking is 
incorrect.  See generally id. at 2437–43 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  The 
thrust of her argument is that, in relying on Loretto, the Hornes’ had failed to state a 
claim, since Loretto “only applies where all property rights have been destroyed by 
governmental action.”  Id. at 2437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Since the marketing 
order did not destroy all of the raisin growers’ rights (the growers retained the future 
pro rata right to the reserve tonnage), the order could not constitute a taking.  Id. at 
2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  This Note agrees largely with this analysis—in 
particular with Justice Sotomayor’s conclusion that the majority fundamentally 
misunderstands Loretto.  In Loretto, the property owner was required by statue to 
suffer a permanent physical occupation of her property.  See supra discussion 
accompanying notes 46–53.  On its face, the marketing order requires the RAC to 




Court’s decision to rely on the “market-value” standard to calculate just 
compensation instead of striving for a more realistic assessment of 
compensation through the Bauman doctrine.116  Just compensation was not 
central to the case, and, indeed, was not one of the questions presented in the 
petition for writ of certiorari.117  Accordingly, the Court dealt with the matter 
only in the majority opinion’s closing paragraphs, holding that “[t]he 
Government has already calculated the amount of just compensation in this 
case, when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins: 
$483,843.53.”118  Estopping the government from seeking a different 
calculation certainly afforded the court a measure of expediency.  But the 
cost of estoppel in this instance, and the similar instances that may follow, 
could turn out to be greater than expected.   
As Justice Breyer illustrated in his concurrence, Bauman v. Ross 
established an exception to the “fair-market-value” calculation for just 
compensation where only a portion of land was taken.119  As Justice Breyer 
argued, Bauman and its progeny are relevant to Horne II because “the benefit 
[to the Hornes as a result of the marketing order] might equal or exceed the 
value of the raisins taken . . . [and] [i]n that case, the California Raisin 
Marketing Order does not effect a taking without just compensation.”120  It is 
therefore curious why the Bauman doctrine did not garner more attention 
from the majority.121   
                                                                                                               
maximize the beneficial effect the marketing order is designed to create, and return 
the proceeds of the reserve tonnage to the growers.  See supra discussion 
accompanying notes 90–97.  Further, in Loretto, the plaintiff’s property at the time 
of the suit was physically occupied by cable equipment, whereas the Hornes had not 
complied with the marketing order during the year in question, and had sued to avoid 
payment of civil penalties.  See supra discussion accompanying notes 102–105.  
Therefore, Horne II should have turned only on the constitutionality of the regulation 
itself and not on the government’s physical appropriation of raisins.  There had been 
not been one.  Id.  Necessarily then, Horne II presented a regulatory takings claim 
and not a physical takings claim, though the majority nonetheless seized on the 
physical nature of the set-aside and ran with it.  Horne II, 135 S. Ct at 2424 (“[A] 
percentage of a grower’s crop must be physically set aside . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
116  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2432. 
117  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2319 (2015) (No. 
14-275), 2014 WL 4404781 at *i. 
118  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2433. 
119  Id. at 2434 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
discussion supra accompanying notes 66–68. 
120  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2435. 
121  See id. at 2436 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“But 
neither am I aware of any precedent that would distinguish between how the Bauman 
doctrine applies to the reserve requirement itself and how it applies to other types of 
partial takings.”); see also supra Part III.A. 
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This Note has explained the benefits that the marketing order was 
designed to create.122  Presumably, a court could conduct largely the same 
analysis.  Along with the aid of expert witnesses, it could then quantify those 
benefits and appropriately set them off from the raisins’ market value.  But 
even ignoring Chief Justice Roberts’ decision to not apply the Bauman 
doctrine to this specific case, the majority’s adherence to the market-value 
standard is, on its own, problematic.   
The reason the majority gives for dismissing the government’s argument 
for remand (and the concurring Justices’ concerns) is briefly stated: 
“[Bauman and its progeny] raise complicated questions involving the 
exercise of the eminent domain power, but they do not create a generally 
applicable exception to the usual compensation rule, based on asserted 
regulatory benefits of the sort at issue here.”123  As a means of advancing 
judicial expediency, this one paragraph rejection is effective.  But the quoted 
sentence is a conclusion, not an explanation, and a reticence to address 
“complicated questions” does nothing to settle them.   
The Court may see a distinction with regards to partial real-property 
takings pursuant to eminent domain powers and partial personal-property 
takings vis-à-vis just compensation.  However, the Court in no uncertain 
terms held that the requirements attendant to per se takings apply with equal 
force whether the underlying property is personalty or realty.  A later 
implication, even a nuanced one, to the contrary would create an internal 
contradiction undermining the majority’s formalistic reasoning.   
The more likely rationale is that the Court was concerned with the 
practical ramifications of embarking on the more complex Bauman doctrine 
analysis.  Chief Justice Roberts (thankfully) noted that the government had 
cited no support for application of Bauman to personal property takings.124  
This does not mean, however, that no such support exists. 
In U.S. v. Commodities Trading Corp,125 the Court held that, while 
“market value has normally been accepted as a just standard [of determining 
compensation] . . . when market value has been too difficult to find, or when 
its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public, courts 
have fashioned and applied other standards.”126  Likewise, Justice Jackson 
argued, albeit in dissent, that a government mandated price should not “be 
used as the sole measure of just compensation.”127  The Horne II court would 
                                                
122  See supra Part II. The AMAA and the California Raisin Marketing 
Order. 
123  Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2432. 
124  Id. 
125  339 U.S. 121 (1950). 
126  Id. at 123. 
127  Id. at 141 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  In Commodities Trading Corp., the 
government during wartime had taken a quantity of whole black pepper and sought 
to pay only the price-per-pound established by Congress through the Emergency 




therefore not have been without precedent in finding an exception to the 
general market-value rule.  Indeed, given the lengths to which the RAC and 
the USDA had gone in ensuring that the marketing order afforded direct 
benefits to growers through price and market stability, there is an argument 
that applying the market-value standard did result in “manifest injustice” to 
some extent. 
Legal scholarship is relatively scarce on the applicability of the Bauman 
doctrine to personal property,128 but many scholars are unequivocal regarding 
the inadequacy of the market-value method to complex takings cases.129  This 
Note does not purport to suggest that Bauman should definitively be 
incorporated wholesale into all partial-taking just compensation 
determinations.  That question is beyond the scope of this Note.  What this 
Note does suggest is that the Bauman doctrine deserves more attention than it 
received in Horne II.  The majority underestimated the capacity of modern 
trial courts to accurately calculate incidental benefits.  The following section 
elaborates on one commentator’s predictions as to Horne II’s further-
reaching implications.  
C. Future Problems 
  
Ryan Cooper of The Week, in his recap of Horne II, posed the following 
hypothetical as an example: 
                                                                                                               
Price Control Act.  Id. at 122–23.  The plaintiff sought a higher price–one closer to 
what the pepper might fetch if the price were not artificially suppressed.  Id.  The 
similarities between Commodities Trading Corp. and Horne II are evident, though 
the pricing situation is reversed.  Both involve agricultural commodities subject to 
government programs that intentionally alter the commodity’s price.  It is worth 
considering whether Commodities Trading Corp. might have come out differently 
but for its unique background facts. 
128  See, e.g., Gary Knapp, Annotation: Supreme Court's views as to what 
constitutes “just compensation” required, under Federal Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment, for taking of private personal property for public use, 155 L. ED. 2d 
1185, § 18 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing United States v. Commodities Trading Corp); 
John J. Costonis, “Fair” Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes 
For the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1041–
42 (1975) (discussing application of Bauman’s “benefit set-off” method in federal 
and state courts and expressing incredulity as to the courts’ arguments that it presents 
practical inapplicability). 
129  See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation 
Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (2007) (“[I]n practice, current law settles for the 
payment of the market value of the property taken—a benchmark that often falls far 
short of the reserve price of the aggrieved owner.”).  This and other inadequacies 
have been noted by jurists as well, such as Judge Richard Posner, who asserts that 
“[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is [] not full compensation, for market 
value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but 
merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”  Consiton Corp. 
v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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Consider a climate policy that simultaneously enacted a tax 
on carbon pollution and nationalized a bunch of coal 
reserves.  Those reserves are valuable today because it is 
possible to pollute the atmosphere with greenhouse gases 
and harm society without paying for the damage.  Therefore, 
a carbon tax would reduce their value.  But under Roberts’ 
reasoning, the government would be required to pay the 
previous (likely enormous) price of the coal without being 
allowed to consider the fact that the previous value was 
based to a great extent on essentially a theft from the rest of 
society. 130 
 
As a doctrinal matter, Mr. Cooper is correct that, if Horne II’s reasoning 
were applied, the government would be required to pay the artificially-
enhanced price because just compensation is determined at the time of 
taking.131  At least, this is what the market-value method would dictate.132  
This example is dramatic and perhaps oversimplified, but it demonstrates 
how potentially unjust the resulting compensation windfall would be for the 
private property owner, and how concomitantly damaging the results could 
be to the public.   
A state actor looking to regulate in the field of private property or 
property prices should always consider ex ante whether a regulation could 
conceivably constitute a taking, and factor that consideration into cost 
determinations.133  Where the state actor ignores the private costs of 
government action, takings scholars say she is operating under a “fiscal 
illusion.”134  Under efficiency-based justifications for the Takings Clause, the 
just compensation requirement helps to avoid the fiscal illusion by 
constitutionally requiring payment of private costs in the event a planned 
government action involves a taking.135  However, as Abraham Bell and 
Gideon Parchomovsky argue, where the government is required to pay only 
market value for property, and the market undervalues the private property 
by ignoring external factors, the government will take too much.136  The cost 
                                                
130  Ryan Cooper, How the Supreme Court just quietly rolled back a key element 
of the New Deal, THE WEEK (June 24, 2015), 
http://theweek.com/articles/562363/how-supreme-court-just-quietly-rolled-back-key-
element-new-deal [https://perma.cc/BE3J-Y64Q].  
131  Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
132  Id. 
133  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 129, at 881–82. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. at 882. 
136  Id. 




of the taking will be lower.  This, of course, would strike an unhealthy 
balance between private and public interests.   
The type of regulation in Horne II presents the opposite situation: where 
the market overvalues property by neglecting the incidental benefits the 
owner has already received, the government will be less likely to take, even 
if the taking would be beneficial.  The cost of such action would be higher.  
No matter how sensible the regulation might be, the government would have 
to think twice before pursuing it, which on its own would likely compound 
costs.  In short, a strict adherence to the market-value method of calculating 
compensation in complex takings cases has the potential to make regulation 
far more costly than it need be.   
An application of the Bauman doctrine could alleviate this problem to an 
extent.  Continuing with Mr. Cooper’s hypothetical, a court could use the 
Bauman doctrine to offset the incidental benefit the government’s tax-free 
regulatory scheme had provided against the coal’s market price.  This would 
allow the compensation the government owed to more accurately 
approximate the coal’s intrinsic value.  Consequently, though the owner 
would obtain less than market value for her property, the government would 
not be forced to pay again for a boon it had already granted.  In this 
hypothetical context, and in the context of Horne II, this seems to strike a 




Unfortunately, under Commodities Trading Corp., the exception to the 
market-value method is available “only ‘when market value has been too 
difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to 
owner or public.’”137  The Court did not provide more explicit guidance as to 
when a court may elect to apply Bauman, for instance, as opposed to the 
market-value method.  But with regards to Horne II, Chief Justice Roberts 
implicitly acknowledged the difficulty of adequately determining the reserve 
tonnage raisin’s value when he glossed over the just compensation issue at 
the close of his opinion.  Further, this Note has gone to modest lengths to 
demonstrate why the strict, formalistic application of the market-value 
method may result in injustice to the public.  What Horne II accomplishes, 
then, is to draw into serious question the future applicability of Commodities 
Trading Corp., and create roadblocks to future governmental regulation.  In 
short, the Supreme Court squandered a prime opportunity to explore and 
settle a nebulous area of law, even with Justice Breyer and his fellow partial-
dissenters raising the issue.   
                                                
137  U.S. v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (quoting U.S. v. 
Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)). 
